Abstract
Introduction
Due to the continuously falling costs of video capture equipment, it is becoming possible to record, store and process large quantities of video data. As a consequence, an increasing number of research projects aim at continuously observing and monitoring people in private spaces. The Caremedia project at CMU for example captures and analyzes video data recorded in a nursing home facility to support medical personnel in diagnosing and treating behavioral problems of the elderly [5] . The Aware Home project at Georgia Tech equipped a house with an extensive sensor network (including video cameras) with a similar goal of monitoring elderly people [1] . Privacy concerns of non-consenting subjects however limit the abilities of researchers to exchange raw data and often require labor intensive manual post-processing to remove portions of the data. These are examples of a growing number of applications in which valuable video data can not be shared due to fear of re-identification. Out of this situation the need for automatic methods to remove identifying information from images, particulary the face region, arises. The goal is to remove as much identifying information as necessary while preserving as much of the data utility as possible.
Previous work on de-identifying facial images falls in one of two categories: ad-hoc methods such as "blurring" or "pixelation" [20] or formal methods such as k-Same [21] or k-Same-Select [12] . Both types of approaches have shortcomings which we address in this paper. We first propose a new algorithm, k-Same-M, which combines a modelbased face parameterization with a formal privacy protection model. We demonstrate that the algorithm achieves privacy protection similar to previously proposed methods, while producing de-identified images of much higher quality. We furthermore show that the proposed k-Same-M algorithm better preserves data utility than the previously proposed k-Same algorithm or ad hoc methods such as blur filtration. We furthermore describe two completely automatic algorithms to attack the protection provided by pixelation.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we survey related work. Section 3 defines face de-identification along with other concepts used in the paper. Section 4 introduces model-based face de-identification and describes the k-Same-M algorithm. In Section 5 we evaluate the privacy protection afforded by the k-Same-M algorithm and examine the resulting data utility. Finally, Section 6 examines the popular algorithm of pixelation and shows its inadequacy for protecting privacy.
Related Work
While there is a rich body of work on privacy protection for field-structured data [2] , specifically medical data [25] , comparatively little has been done in the context of video surveillance. The majority of work on images or image sequences applies simple distortion methods such as "pixelation" (image subsampling) or "blurring" (smoothing the image with e.g. a Gaussian filter with large variance) to obfuscate parts or all of the image [7, 17, 20, 27] . The PrivacyCam architecture proposed by Senior et al. [24] suppresses automatically segmented foreground objects in the scene and cryptographically secures access to the altered video stream produced by the system. While some of these techniques have been shown to reduce the capability of human observers to identify people or actions in the scene [7, 20, 27] , no formal privacy guarantees are made.
In more recent work on face de-identification by Newton et al. [21] the k-Same algorithm is introduced, which offers formal privacy protection guarantees. k-Same is based on the k-anonymity framework introduced by Sweeney [25] . The algorithm guarantees that each de-identified face image could be representative of k faces in the gallery, therefore limiting face recognition performance to 1/k. Unlike the methods discussed above, [21] also addresses the problem of adaptive recognition in which an adversery mimics the obfuscation technique employed by a privacy-protection algorithm. Newton et al. experimentally showed that adhoc methods fail to protect privacy in the case of (manually guided) adaptive recognition, whereas the k-Same algorithm offers protection guarantees even in this case.
In a different approach, Phillips [22] proposed an algorithm for privacy protection of facial images through reduction of the number of eigenvectors used in reconstructing images from basis vectors. A direct trade-off between privacy protection and data utility is established through the introduction of the privacy operating characteristic (POC), a plot similiar to a receiver operating characteristic (ROC) often used in pattern classifier design [11] .
In order to overcome the trade-off between privacy protection and data utility the k-Same-Select algorithm was introduced as direct extension of the k-Same algorithm [12] . It was shown that the k-Same-Select algorithm preserves data utility (as measured by the accuracy of gender and facial expression classifiers) while guaranteeing privacy protection. However, the k-Same-Select algorithm, like all algorithms discussed above, is strictly appearance-based and works directly on the pixel level. As a consequence, commonly appearing mismatches in image alignment (the correspondence between pixels in images) lead to poor quality in de-identified images.
Face Recognition and Face De-Identification

Defi nitions
In this section we provide definitions of all basic concepts related to face de-identification. See Figure 1 for an overview. Note that grayscale images of dimension h × w are converted into vectors of dimension n = h * w through rasterscanning. For color images we concatenate the vectors obtained by rasterscanning the different color channels, so that n = h * w * 3. In this work we consider two different coding schemes: 
Example 3.2 (Model-Based Coding) In model-based coding a previously learned generative model is fitted to the input image by changing the model parameters until the difference between the original image and the image reconstructed from the model is minimal. The model parameter vector is then used as encoding of the input image.
In the following we assume that all face images are coded, either appearance-based or model-based. For notational ease we simply refer to them as images.
Definition 3.2 (Image Sets) We distinguish a number of different sets of facial images.
The gallery contains face images of individuals known to a face recognition algorithm:
The probe set contains images of unknown people: P = {P (1, 1) , P (1, 2) , . . . , P (1,m1) , . . . , P (n,1) , P (n,2) , . . . , P (n,mn) }. The goal of face recognition is therefore the correct linking of images in the probe set to images in the gallery set. We furthermore define the generic face set
This definition of image sets follows the standard established for the FERET evaluations [23] .
Definition 3.3 (Face Recognition) We define face recognition as function
. . , u} which, given a probe image p ∈ P and a gallery G, with |G| = u outputs the index of the subject most likely to correspond to the subject seen in the probe image:
By convention we extend Φ to apply as well to a probe set P with |P| = v as Φ :
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Face Recognition Probe RR P P Figure 1 . Overview of the de-identification framework. Using the de-identification function Φ, the image set P is mapped to the deidentified image set P . We evaluate the performance of the deidentification function Φ in terms of privacy protection afforded by measuring face recognition performance (RR) and in terms of preserved data quality.
We evaluate face recognition performance by computing cumulative match characteristics (CMC) for a given face recognition function Φ and gallery and probe sets P and G. The CMC contains for each rank (position in the similarity ordering of the face recognition function output) the likelihood that the algorithm returns the correct answer at or below this rank [6] . The simplest way of reporting the performance of face recognition algorithms is to report rank 1 recognition rates. The implicit goal of a face de-identification method Ψ is to remove identifying information from face images, so that
CM C(Φ, Ψ(P), G) < CMC(Φ, P, G).
One formal approach to privacy protection that has gained popularity in recent years is k-anonymity [25] . The idea underlying k-anonymity is to ensure that every data attribute that could be used to identify a particular user relates indiscriminatively to at least k elements in the dataset. Applied to sets of faces we therefore define (following [21] ): Maximum privacy protection is trivially achieved by surpressing the data, e.g. by setting each pixel value in an image to 0. We strive to guarantee privacy protection while preserving as much of the original signal as possible. 
Model-Based De-Identification
This section introduces the proposed algorithm, k-Same-M. We motivate the work by demonstrating significant shortcomings of the previously proposed k-Same algorithm [21] . We furthermore give a brief introduction to Active Appearance Models.
Shortcomings of Appearance-Based Methods
The algorithms introduced in [21] and [12] are both appearance based, operating entirely in the image space. Since both algorithms compute averages of images, artifacts due to misalignments of the images involved are inevitable, even when images are aligned based on a small number of feature points (e.g. the eyes and the tip of the nose). This leads to a reduction of data utility at higher levels of privacy protection (see Section 5) . As shown in Figure 2 strong "ghosting" artifacts are visible.
Background: Active Appearance Models
Active Appearance Models (AAMs) are generative parametric models that have been used successfully for modelling and tracking faces [9, 19] . In the following we give a brief description on constructing and fitting AAMs.
Definition and Model Construction
The 2D shape of an AAM is defined by a 2D triangulated mesh and in particular the vertex locations of the mesh. Mathematically, the shape s of an AAM is defined as the 2D coordinates of the n vertices that make up the mesh: s = (x 1 , y 1 , x 2 , y 2 , . . . , x n , y n ) T . AAMs allow linear shape variation. This means that the shape matrix s can be expressed as a base shape s 0 plus a linear combination 
where the coefficients p i are the shape parameters. AAMs are computed from training data consisting of a set of images with the shape mesh hand marked on them [9] . After geometrically aligning the training shapes using the Procrustes algorithm [10] , Principal Component Analysis (PCA) [18] is applied to the aligned training meshes. The base shape s 0 is the mean shape and the matrices s i are the (reshaped) eigenvectors corresponding to the m largest eigenvalues.
The appearance of the AAM is defined within the base mesh s 0 . Let s 0 also denote the set of pixels u = (u, v) T that lie inside the base mesh s 0 . The appearance of the AAM is then an image A(u) defined over the pixels u ∈ s 0 . AAMs allow linear appearance variation. This means that the appearance A(u) can be expressed as a base appearance A 0 (u) plus a linear combination of l appearance images A i (u):
where the coefficients λ i are the appearance parameters. The appearance images A i are usually computed by applying PCA to the shape normalized training images [9, 19] . We furthermore define the vector c = {p 1 , . . . , p n , λ 1 , . . . , λ m } as concatenation of the shape parameters p i and the appearance parameters λ i .
Model Fitting
Fitting a AAM is usually formulated [19] as minimizing the sum of squares difference between the model instance
and the input image warped back onto the base mesh I(W(x; p)):
where the sum is performed over all of the pixels x in the base mesh s 0 . A number of fitting algorithms have been proposed for the minimization of the expression in Eqn. 3 ranging from the very efficient project-out algorithm [19] and the less efficient but more accurate simultaneous inverse compositional algorithm [3] to efficient robust fitting algorithms capable of dealing with occlusion [13] .
Model-Based k-Same: k-Same-M
For subject images within the modelling space of a given AAM the model is able to describe the image with high accuracy, meaning that the face image reconstructed from the model parameters is very close in appearance to the original face image. Coupled with the generative nature of the AAM it is intuitive to perform face de-identification in the space of the model parameters instead of the image space. We therefore extend the previously proposed k-Same algorithm [21] to the k-Same-M algorithm by performing k-Same on AAM model parameter vectors. Intuitively, k-Same-M works by computing the average of k AAM parameter vectors computed from a set of faces and replacing the vectors with the average vector. See algorithm box 4.1 for a definition of kSame-M. It has been shown previously [21] that image sets de-identified with the k-Same algorithm are k-anonymized. The same holds for parameter sets de-identified using the k-Same-M algorithm. Figure 3 shows example images of faces de-identified using k-Same-M. The images are of visually higher quality in comparison to the images shown in Figure 2 . Notice that no "ghosting" artifacts are present.
Experiments
To evaluate the privacy protection afforded by the proposed k-Same-M algorithm we conducted recognition experiments using Principal Component Analysis [26] .
Dataset
We used a subset of the CMU Multi-PIE face database [14] containing 249 subjects displaying a neutral and a smile expression. The images were captured within minutes of each other as part of a multi-camera, multi-flash recording. In the experiments here only images with frontal pose and frontal illumination were used. AAM ground-truth was manually established for all 498 face images. See Figure 4 for example images.
Evaluation of Privacy Protection
We divided the subject pool into non-overlapping sets for training and gallery/probe, following the experimental setup established in the FERET evaluations [23] . We used 30% of the subjects for training of the PCA eigenspace with original, unaltered images. For the remaining subjects, the neutral expression images were used as gallery and the smile images as probe. All results reported are based on randomly selecting five different subject assignments into training and gallery/probe sets and computing the average recognition rate over all configurations. Figure 5 shows rank-1 accuracies and CMC curves for face images de-identified for the different variants of the kSame algorithm. The recognition rates stay below the theoretical maximum of 1/k [21] (see Figure 5(a) ). The recognition accuracy of k-Same is slightly below the accuracy of k-Same-M, potentially due to the noise introduced by this algorithm. Figure 5(b) shows CMC curves for the k-Same-M algorithm for different levels of k. Performance declines steadily with increasing k, illustrating the amount of deidentification necessary to achieve a given privacy goal.
Evaluation of Data Utility
Depending on the application, many different measures of data utility are possible, ranging from simple distance metrics to the evaluation of the presence of certain image features determined by specific classifiers. Following [12] we evaluated data utility through facial expression classification. We say that more data utility is preserved if a facial expression classifier performs better on a certain image set. In experiments we employed a Support Vector Machine classifier with Radial Basis Kernel, implemented using LIBSMV [8] . We performed 5-fold cross-validation by partitioning the dataset into five near equally sized subsets, trainining in turn on four subsets and testing on the remaining fifth. The reported classification accuracy is averaged over the five experiments. Figure 6 shows classification accuracy plots for images de-identified using k-Same and kSame-M (Figure 6(a) ) 1 and for images de-identified using blur filtration (Figure 6(b) ). The accuracy for both variants of the k-Same algorithm is substantially higher than in the case of blur filtration. Furthermore, data utility of the images de-identified using the proposed k-Same-M algorithm is slightly better than the data utility of the previously introduced k-Same algorithm.
How Not To Protect Privacy: Pixelation
In the popular media, in data protection legislation [12] as well as in parts of the scientific literature, pixelation filters are considered adequate means to protect privacy [17, 27] . Previous studies have already suggested that this is not the case [12, 21] . In this section we provide further evidence by demonstrating multiple ways to achieve high recognition accuracies on pixelated images.
Image Pixelation
Pixelation occurs as unwanted side effect when the resolution of an image is increased using a simple method such as nearest neighbor interpolation. In the de-identification setting pixelation is performed by replacing all pixel values in all sub-blocks of given constant size in an image by the average pixel value of the block. As the size of the subblocks increases more information is removed from the image. See Figure 7 for example images.
Attacks on Ad-Hoc Methods
Automatic Parrot Recognition
Newton et al proposed to defeat pixelation along with other ad-hoc de-identification methods by applying the same transformation on both the training images as well as the Recognition performance declines steadily with increasing k, illustrating the amount of de-identification necessary to achieve a given privacy goal. gallery images [21] . In extension of this work we developed a simple detection algorithm to determine the amount of pixelation applied to the image. The algorithm counts runs of pixels with identical or nearly identical pixel values in both the x and y direction and uses a voting scheme to determine a single pixelation value across the whole image. A similar attack on images de-identifed by blur filtration is described in [15] .
Resolution Enhancement
Since pixelated images are essentially low-resolution versions of the original image scaled to the size of the input image, resolution enhancement algorithms can be applied directly to defeat the protection afforded by pixelation. Much work has been devoted in recent years to resolution enhancement methods, especially for face images [4, 16] . We report results using the algorithm described in [16] .
Experiments
We performed experiments on a 275 subject subset of the FERET database using fa images in the gallery and fb images as probes [23] . The recognition experiments followed the same protocol as described in Section 5.2. Figure 8 shows results of recognition experiments using PCA on both the original fa and fb images as well as images pixelated to various degrees. In Figure 8 (a) we see inadequate privacy protection for anything but that highest level of pixelation. Notice that for p = 2 and p = 4 recognition rates stay virtually unchanged. Even at the comparatively high pixelation level p = 8 a rank-1 recognition of 40% is achieved. We therefore conclude that pixelation does not adequately protect privacy. Figure 9 . Comparison of recognition performance for pixelated probe images and enhanced pixelated probe images. For small levels of pixelation, enhancement improves the recognition accuracy.
Privacy Protection
Automatic Parrot Recognition
We used the algorithm described in Section 6.2.1 to automatically detect the amount of pixelation present in probe images and applied the same amount of pixelation to gallery images. Training images and the separately computed eigenspace remained unchanged. As shown in Figure 8 (b) the resulting recognition rates are even higher than the rates achieved on the original, unaltered images for all but the highest level of pixelation.
Image Enhancing Methods
We applied the algorithm proposed by Hardie et al. [16] to pixelated images and compared the recognition perfor-mance on these enhanced images with performance on pixelated images. We found small performance improvements for the enhanced images for low pixelation levels (p = 2 and p = 4) and decreases in performance for a higher pixelation level (p = 8). See Figure 9 .
Conclusion
In this section we showed that even under the "best" circumstances, the privacy protection afforded by pixelation is fairly low. With simple attacks such as the automatic parrot recognition and image enhancing methods the little protection that pixelation provides can be further eroded. We conclude that pixelation is inadequat as a privacy protection mechanism.
Summary
In this paper we introduced a novel framework for the protection of privacy in facial images. We showed that our k-Same-M algorithm offers privacy protection similar to previously proposed algorithm, while producing deidentified images of much better quality. We furthermore provided additional evidence that simple ad-hoc methods such as pixelation are inadequate for protecting privacy.
